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United States Arms Transfer Decision-Making: 
Determinants of Sales versus Aid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The United States is the most prevalent exporter of arms since the end of the World War II, but 
little quantitative research exists on its decisions to export.  Instead, the literature focuses on the 
effects of their arms transfers (Blanton 2000, 2005; Sanjian 1999, 2001).  Of course, a broader 
literature on arms transfers exists that focuses on United States decision-making from either a 
historical or qualitative perspective (Hammond et al 1983; Krause 1991; Mott 2002), which is a 
subset of the general arms transfer decision-making literature (Brauer 1991; Frank 1969; 
Harkavy 1975; Smith, Humm, and Fontanel 1985).  All of the literature agrees upon the broad 
motivation for exporting arms ± security, influence, and economics ± which I focus on here. 
 
Strategic arms transfers occur when the exporter believes their overall security is enhanced by 
providing friendly governments and/or allies with arms (Cahn 1979; Eikenberry 1995; Stanley 
and Pearton 1972).  Influence seeking transfers occur when the exporting government believes 
they can affect the LPSRUWHU¶V domestic or foreign policy behavior (Catrina 1988; Krause 1991, 
1992; Sanjian 2001).  Economic motivated transfers occur because arms industries are not 
economically efficient without export ± states that produce major weapons systems export them 
(Kapstein 1992; Kinsella 2002; Pearson 1994; Sanjian 1991). 
 
One issue is that it is rare to separate the different types of export ± sales and aid.  Sales provide 
direct economic benefits to industries with an influx of hard capital.  Aid provides indirect 
economic benefits to exporters via economies of scale, reduced learning curves, and lower 
production line start-up costs (Cahn 1979).  Historically, the major powers are the largest 
providers of military aid and the United States and Soviet Union represent a supermajority, but 
since the end of the Cold War the United States has largely stood alone as a provider of military 
aid. 
 
In this article, I examine the determinants of United States arms transfers examining sales 
separate from aid.  I begin by discussing factors that affect decision-making of the United States 
based on security, political, and economic considerations. Then I describe the data and test 
before reviewing the results. 
 
United States Decision-Making 
 
The security interests of the United States revolve around explicit and implicit ties with other 
states.  Defense pacts are an explicit tie between states where a state is obligated to join another 
that has been attacked by a third-party.  Due to the United States status as a superpower they are 
desired as an alliance partner, which means they can be selective.  They should then seek 
alliances with states that serve a strategic interest and have greater capabilities to avoid having to 
join an undesirable conflict with a weak partner.  Because allies typically have a larger economy 
means they also have the resources to purchase arms. Moreover, if alliance partners use the same 
types of weapons there is an interoperability of forces, increasing the effectiveness of the alliance 
(Cahn 1979; Pearson 1989).  Defense pact members will receive arms from the United States, 
but transfers will be more likely to be sales rather than aid. 
 
Implicit ties represent the United States strategic interests in states based on geopolitical 
importance, as opposed to internal characteristics of the state.  One indicator that affects United 
States decision-making is land contiguity with a communist state.  During the Cold War weapons 
were often transferred to states in order to prevent Soviet incursions if they were deemed too 
risky to enter a defense pact with.  While the United States disdain towards communist states did 
not end with the Cold War it was reduced overall.  With an exception of the European buffer 
states, communist contiguous states were mostly in less developed regions, which means 
economic resources were not always available to purchase weapons.  States contiguos with 
communist countries will receive arms from the United States, but more arms will be provided 
through aid rather than sales. 
 
Political relationships between the United States and potential arms importers are related to 
implicit ties.  Three types of states are considered: democracies, autocracies, and communist 
states.  The obvious expectation is that communist state should not be eligible for arms from the 
United States because of the bipolar system during the Cold War, but they do receive some over 
time.  The other obvious expectation is that democracies should be more likely to receive arms 
than autocratic states and in greater amounts, but empirically autocratic states consistently 
receive arms from the United States ± particularly during the Cold War.  While there are reasons 
to provide arms to autocratic states and certain communist states related to gaining influence 
there is greater motivation to provide democracies with arms in order to support political allies, 
particularly with sales as these weapons typically possess greater capabilities than donated 
weapons. 
 
Economics is a driving force in the arms trade for both the exporter and importer; but in a single 
state study, the economics of the importer are more important.  States with larger economies 
have more interests and greater resources available to protect them.  These states should want 
higher quality weapons, which are often not available through aid.  The implication is that states 
with more resources are eligible for the purchase of arms from the United States and in larger 
amounts.  The alternative explanation, however, is that states with more resources are also more 
likely to have domestic arms industries.  Either way, the United States will expect states to 
purchase arms if they have the resources to do so. 
 
Data and Method 
 
The dependent variables come from government reports via two different agencies.  The 
Federation of American Scientists website hosts the military sales data that originally came from 
the now defunct Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  The reports measure transfers from the 
United States in current thousands of US$ between 1950 and 2008.  USAID data is used for 
military aid between 1950 and 2008 that is measured in constant millions 2008 US$.  Both sets 
of data are converted into actual dollars ± the military sales data are first converted into 2008 
constant US$ for consistency in measurement ± before adding one and taking the natural log of 
the value. 
 
The independent variables come from a variety of sources commonly used in the peace science 
and conflict research literature.  Defense pacts are measured as one if this type of alliance is 
present and the data come from the Alliance Treaty and Obligation Project (Leeds et al 2002).  
Communist, autocracy, and democracy are coded as one for the relevant government type.  The 
autocracy and democracy categories are drawn from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr, and 
Jagger 2010) and states with a polity score greater than or equal to seven are considered 
democracies.  Communist contiguity is coded as one if the importer is land contiguous with a 
communist state.  GDP and GDP/pc of the importer are coded using data from Gleditsch (2002).  
These values are real dollars plus one and the natural log is taken in a similar manner to the arms 
data. 
 
I include time period, trade, and conflict status as controls.  The time periods are Cold War, post-
Cold War, and post-9/11.  Trade is from Gleditsch (2002) and is transformed in a similar manner 
as the GDP data.  The conflict data for war, conflict, civil war, and civil conflict come from the 
Correlates of War project.  The descriptive statistics of the variables are in Table 1. 
 
I use Heckman models to account for the selection effects that are present in arms transfer 
decision-making.  Selection models are appropriate as Blanton (2005) states that with foreign 
military sales the United States approves states to be eligible for exports before determining the 
amount of the sale.  The first stage of the model is a binary probit where a value of ³´ 
represents that weapons were transferred in the relevant form; ³´ represents no transfer.  The 
observations from the first stage where a transfer occurred are the sample for the second stage.  
The second stage is an OLS where the dependent variable is the value of the transfer that 
accounts for the selection effects in the first.  The same set of variables cannot be used in both 
stages due to correlation issues with the inverse Mills ratio that accounts for the selection effects 
between the two stages. 
 
Results and Conclusion 
 
The results of the tests are presented in Table 2.  The transfer stage variables representing 
strategic interests ± defense pact and communist contiguous ± generally match expectations.  The 
presence of a defense pact increases the likelihood of a transfer for both sales and aid, but the 
substantive effect is stronger for sales.  Communist contiguity is only significant in the aid 
model, which is consistent with the argument.  Aid is typically older models or used weapons 
and the United States has a motivation to support these states, but not necessarily with modern 
arms.  In the amount stage, the defense pact coefficients show the same pattern in sign and 
substantive effect.  Communist contiguity shifts, however, where the aid coefficient is 
insignificant and the sales coefficient is negative.  The implication is that if a communist 
contiguous state is eligible for a sale they will receive lower amounts of arms than sales to non-
communist contiguous states. 
 
The baseline category for the regime variables is democracy.  The transfer stage shows that 
autocracies and communist states are less likely to be approved for sales than democracies, 
which is expected.  With aid, however, autocracies are statistically indistinguishable from 
democracies while communist states are less likely to receive aid.  In the amount stage both 
communist coefficients are insignificant while only the autocracy aid coefficient is significant 
and positive.  The latter result is interesting as it shows that if an autocratic state makes it past the 
gatekeeping stage for military aid, the amount they will receive is larger a democracy will, all 
else equal.  The implication is that while democratic regime similarity leads to pacific 
relationships (e.g. the democratic peace), it does not necessarily lead to a strong arms 
relationship, which is surprising.  Alternatively, by providing aid to autocratic states the United 
States may be trying to exert influence over the LPSRUWHU¶V domestic or foreign policy behavior. 
 With the importer economic variables, GDP is insignificant in both models in the transfer stage 
while GDP per capita is negative and significant. The explanation for the effect of GDP per 
capita for sales in the transfer model is not that states with wealthier societies are not eligible for 
United States arms, but that these states are also more likely to have their own arms industries.  
The negative relationship in the aid model suggests that either the United States does not want to 
give away weapons to states that can afford them or the importer wants better quality weapons.  
In the amount stage, the GDP coefficients are positive and significant showing that even though 
there is no effect in the first stage, if states with greater economic resources are eligible for sales 
or aid they will receive more weapons than other states, all else equal.  A similar effect happens 
with GDP per capita in the sales model ± even though states with wealthier societies are less 
likely to purchase arms from the United States, if they do they will purchase larger amounts than 
poorer states all else equal.   
 
This article shows that are some clear differences between in the decision-making process of the 
United States to transfer weapons as sales or aid.  The next step beyond looking at sales and aid 
is to look at the type of sale (e.g. weapons versus construction) and the type of aid (e.g. weapons 
versus training or education) in order to determine the differences in decision-making and how 
the provision of one type may lead to the provision of another type.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
        
Military Sales 0 30.96 8.93 
Military Aid 0 23.03 7.74 
Defense Pact 0 1 0.31 
 
Communist Contiguous 0 1 0.16 
Autocracy 0 1 0.53 
Communist 0 1 0.10 
GDP (Log) 18.68 29.86 24.14 
GDP/pc (Log) 4.89 13.36 8.23 
Cold War 0 1 0.63 
Post-9/11 0 1 0.16 
Trade (Log) 0 27.08 19.08 
War 0 1 0.04 
Conflict 0 1 0.20 
Civil War 0 1 0.05 
Civil Conflict 0 1 0.10 
       
N= 7868    
 
  
Table 2: Heckman Model of United States Arms Transfers 
 Transfer Stage  Amount Stage 
 Sales Aid  Sales Aid 
            
Defense Pact 0.42** 0.37**  2.26** 1.41** 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.33) (0.12) 
Communist Contiguous 0.08 0.25**  -1.84** 0.12 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.36) (0.12) 
Autocracy -0.19** -0.02  0.02 0.31** 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.31) (0.11) 
Communist -1.52** -1.18**  -0.05 -0.57 
 (0.07) (0.08)  (1.32) (0.38) 
GDP (Log) 0.02 -0.02  0.82** 0.59** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.12) (0.04) 
GDP/pc (Log) -0.22** -0.37**  1.08** -0.11 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.16) (0.07) 
Cold War -0.09* -0.29**  4.75** 1.19** 
 (0.04) (0.04)  (0.33) (0.12) 
Post-9/11 -0.60** -0.09  -13.30** 0.62** 
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.45) (0.14) 
Trade (Log) 0.12** 0.09**  0.79** -0.06 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.10) (0.03) 
War -0.41** -0.48**    
 (0.09) (0.09)    
Conflict -0.17** -0.25**    
 (0.04) (0.04)    
Civil War 0.10 -0.03    
 (0.07) (0.07)    
Civil Conflict 0.13* 0.18**    
 (0.06) (0.05)    
Constant -0.35 1.95**  -33.15** 0.56 
  (0.25) (0.24)   (2.06) (0.70) 
Log Sigma 2.20** 1.04**    
 (0.01) (0.01)    
Observations 7868 7868  5043 4066 
            
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 Std. Errors in Parentheses    
 
 
